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| 08/05/2009 11:33 PM by Thomas Singh; DKL's answer was very helpful!! |
Just wanted to say 'thank you' to David for answering a question I had about the application of Peyton Young's model of conventions to interpersonal trust. Essentially I needed to justify why all trusting/cynical strategies did not 'die out' when trusting others/being cynical was a Nash equilibrium. As I understand it the answer has to do with the persistence of shocks that produce stochastically stable equilibria. Incidentally, in their well-known paper on Trust, Reciprocity and Social History, Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe noted that it was the 'dying out' of strategies that created problems for an evolutionary model of trust. I have a lot more confidence in my paper now! [Manage messages]
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