Economic and Game Theory
|
"Inside every small problem is a large problem struggling to get out." | ||||||
Topics | Thread and Full Text View
Interactive Epistemology is concerned with the epistemic foundations of game theory. E.g. it analyses what are sufficient conditions on the knowledge of players to play Nash equilibrium. It makes use of modal logic (Kripke models) and Aumann structures (i.e. partitions on state spaces and similar). A good introduction by computer scientists is Fagin/Halpern/Moses/Vardi "Reasoning about knowledge", MIT Press as well as two papers by Aumann published in the International Journal of Game Theory 1999. An brief introduction can be also found in standard text books on game theory such as Osborne/Rubinstein "A Course in Game Theory", MIT Press as well as Rubinstein "Modelling Bounded Rationality", MIT Press. Complexity in games: This is field is concerned with questions like "Are Nash Equilibria computable?", "how agents with limited ability to handle complexity do behave?" etc. I don't know of a good book about it but there are more and more papers on those issues by Anderlini and co-others, some Japanese authors (I forgot the name, at Hitobashi University). Just search with keywords. Learning in games: For the last decade, this field became quite popular. How do people of limited ability find to Nash equilibria? Which equilibria are selected? People may use simple rules of thumb? A good review is Fudenberg/Levine "Theory of Learning in Games", MIT Press. Interactive learning issues playes also role in computer science, especially in distributed computing of learning "agents". NASA has a research group on it. [Manage messages]
|