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Consider a classic signaling game (2 types, 2 actions) à la Spence. Suppose furthermore that there are two equilibria: one pooling, one separating. In the pooling eq., say, both types of senders send "Low". In the separating, the [View full text and thread]
Consider a classic signaling game (2 types, 2 actions) à la Spence. Suppose furthermore that there are two equilibria: one pooling, one separating. In the pooling eq., say, both types of senders send "Low". In the separating, the [View full text and thread]
Hi I'm dealing with a problem that has a slight twist to the lion and sheep problem. The problem is as follows
Lions  (1,2 ....K)
Sheeps  (1,2 ....K1)
Lion choose to ( Eat, not eat) sheep
If kth lion choose to eat, he becomes [View full text and thread]
This is a game theory question regarding the elections of a condo. [View full text and thread]
This is a game theory question regarding the elections of a condo. [View full text and thread]
This is a game theory question regarding the elections of a condo. [View full text and thread]
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n player has to decide a on fair numerical value x. Let's say this value is fair around f. All player write their value on a piece of paper face down. One of these values are selcted at random to be the actual value of x. But some [View full text and thread]
Hi All!
I was wondering if anyone could help me out with a game theory question:
My game involves two opposing players, M and W.
M’s objective is to pay the smallest amount. W’s objective is to gain the biggest amount.
M [View full text and thread]
Hi, in 1st Semester we have no Game Theory. Nevertheless this subject fascinates me.
My question in solving any matrices (2x2/3x3): As long I do not know, if players play WeakDominance > At 1st: I use [View full text and thread]
Hi Evreryone,
I am strugling to solve the third question of this exam. Can someone help me to solve it?
Basically, when I solve it I only find one NE ( i.e. Lr). This issue is that there are supposed to be many NE. I checked for [View full text and thread]
PLAYERS: A plaintiff and a defendant
THE ORDER OF PLAY:
1. The plaintiff decides whether to bring suit against the defendant at cost c.
2. The plaintiff makes a takeitorleaveit settlement offer of s>0.
3. The defendant accepts [View full text and thread]
I know that for 2x2 games with two strict equilibrium strategies A and B, the riskdominant equilibrium is the one with a higher product of deviation losses (i.e. what each player would lose by not playing the equilibrium if the other [View full text and thread]
I think the answers to both questions are negative. Consider a twoplayer game where two players (1 and 2) choose the numbers x_1, x_2 from the set [0,2], and the payoff of each player is given by u_i(x_1,x_2)=x_i+(x_1x_2)^2. Then [View full text and thread]
Do we know that each nash equlibrium strategy in such a game is symmetric, too? [View full text and thread]
Hi,
is there some theorem stating, that in every continuous game with symmetric players every nash equlibrium will yield the same utility to all players?
Or something like this for special cases?
The theorem seems quite natural to [View full text and thread]
Pakistani wedding dresses [View full text and thread]
Septum piercing pain, dangers and jewelry. [View full text and thread]
