

Is Behavioral Economics Doomed?

The ordinary versus the extraordinary


Introductory Lecture

David K. Levine


Rational Economic Man

“a lightning calculator of pleasures and pains, who oscillates like a homogenous globule of desire of happiness under the impulse of stimuli” Thorstein Veblen 1899

“The implicit presumption in these ... models was that people could be fooled over and over again.” Robert Lucas 1995



Theory That Works: Voting



Levine and Palfrey [2007]

Theory That Works? Ultimatum Bargaining

x	Offers	Rejection Probability
\$2.00	1	100%
\$3.25	2	50%
\$4.00	7	14%
\$4.25	1	0%
\$4.50	2	100%
\$4.75	1	0%
\$5.00	13	0%
	27	

US \$10.00 stake games, round 10

Roth, Prasnikar, Okuno-Fujiwara, Zamir [1991]

What the Theory Tells us: Losses In Ultimatum


Out of \$10

	Losses
Knowing	\$0.34
Unknowing	\$0.99

Fudenberg and Levine [1997]

- Learning and short-term errors are an important part of mainstream economics

Individual Play in Voting



Procrastinating at the Health Club

- people who choose membership pay more than \$17, even though a \$10-per-visit fee is also available
- agents overestimate ... delay contract cancellation whenever renewal is automatic (\$70 per month)

DellaVigna, Malmendier 200

Hypothesis 1: people think incorrectly that they will cancel tomorrow

Hypothesis 2: people think it will be an expensive hassle to cancel; wait for “hassle” cost to be low

Takes 2.3 months to cancel after stopping attendance

- Eliot Spitzer, Rush Limbaugh and the Las Vegas vacation

Prospect Theory to the Rescue

Suppose that p_i is the chance of winning one of two prizes $x_i \geq 0$

$$U = \sum_i \frac{.846 p_i^{.414}}{.846 p_i^{.414} + (1 - p_i)^{.414}} x_i^{1.056}$$

Bruhin, Fehr-Duda, and Epper [2007]

Would you rather have:

A. \$5,000 for sure

B. a 50-50 coin-flip between \$9,700 dollars and nothing

and you don't exhibit the Allais paradox

Framing and the Becker Marschak DeGroot Elicitation Procedure


➤ Willingness to pay versus willingness to accept

Zeiler and Plott 2004



Psychology versus Economics

- non-functional versus functional people
- narrow models versus broad models
- individual versus group behavior
- arithmetic versus axiomatic models and the domain of concern
- pieces of paper, computers and neuroeconomics



Strengthening Economic Theory

Mainstream models

- learning
- habit formation
- consumer lock-in

Works in progress

- ambiguity aversion and the dishonest
- level-k thinking and one-off play
- menu choice and self-control
- interpersonal preference

Allais Paradox

Take $Q = 1$ billion dollars US

Decision problem 1:

Q for sure

(or)

$.1 \times 5Q, .89 \times 1Q, .01 \times 0Q$

Decision problem 2:

$.1 \times 5Q, .9 \times 0Q$

(or)

$.11 \times 1Q, .89 \times 0Q$

Decision problem 1:

1 x 1Q for sure **[most common choice]**

(or)

.1 x 5Q, .89 x 1Q, .01 x 0Q

Decision problem 2:

.1 x 5Q, .9 x 0Q **[most common choice]**

(or)

.11 x 1Q, .89 x 0Q

So $u(1) > .1u(5) + .89u(1) + .01u(0)$ or $u(5) < 1.1u(1) - .1u(0)$

And $.1u(5) + .9u(0) > .11u(1) + .89u(0)$ or $u(5) > 1.1u(1) - .1u(0)$

Notice that the original problem had Q equal to 1 million US. This doesn't work well anymore because most people make the second choice in the first problem and the first choice in the second problem, which is consistent with expected utility

Two views:

1) this is a big problem [Tversky and Kahneman, 1979]

decent theory due to Machina [1982], Segal [1990]

2) this is a curiosity due to the unusual magnitudes of the payoffs
Rubsinsten [1988], Leland [1994]

Subjective Uncertainty

Ellsburg Paradox

Ellsberg [1961]

Two urns: each contains red balls and black balls

Urn 1: 100 balls, how many red or black is unknown

Urn 2: 50 red and 50 black

Choice 1: bet on urn 1 red or urn 2 red

Choice 2: bet on urn 1 black or urn 2 black

Urn 1: 100 balls, how many red or black is unknown

Urn 2: 50 red and 50 black

Choice 1: bet on urn 1 red or urn 2 red [urn 2]

Choice 2: bet on urn 1 black or urn 2 black [urn 2]

1 says that urn 2 red more likely than urn 1 red

2 says that urn 2 black more likely than urn 2 black

but this is inconsistent with probabilities that add up to 1

Can introduce theory of “ambiguity aversion” as in Schmeidler [1989],
Ghirardato and Marinacci [2000]

Basically probabilities do not add up to one; remaining probability is assigned to “nature” moving after you make a choice and choosing the worst possibility for you. [The stock market always tumbles right after I buy stocks.]

Ellsburg Paradox Paradox

we should be able to break the indifference

Urn 1: 1000 balls, how many red or black is unknown

Urn 2: 501 red and 499 black

Choice 1: bet on urn 1 red or urn 2 black [urn 2]

Choice 2: bet on urn 1 black or urn 2 black [urn 2]

Combine this into a single choice:

Bet on urn 1 red, urn 1 black or urn 2 black

Ambiguity aversion says go with urn 2 black...

But this is a bad idea: flip a coin to decide between urn 1 red and urn 1 black

Risk Aversion

Constant relative risk aversion

$u(x) = \frac{x^{1-\rho}}{1-\rho}$ also known as “constant elasticity of substitution” or CES

$$\rho \geq 0$$

$$-\frac{u''(x)x}{u'(x)} = \frac{\rho x^{-\rho-1}x}{x^{-\rho}} = \rho$$

$\rho = 0$ linear, risk neutral

$\rho = 1$ $u(x) = \log(x)$

useful for empirical work and growth theory

note that constant relative risk aversion implies declining absolute risk aversion

How risk averse are people?

Equity premium

Mehra and Prescott [1985]; Shiller [1989] data annual 1871-1984

Mean real return on bonds $r_b = 1.9\%$; Mean real return on S&P 7.5%

Equity premium $\lambda = .056$

Standard error of real stock return 18.1%, $\sigma = 0.181$.

normalized real per capita consumption standard error $s = .035$

let x denote initial wealth

Let α be fraction of portfolio in S&P

calculate consumption

$$u((1 - \alpha)x(1 + r_b) + \alpha x(1 + \bar{r}_s + \sigma y)) =$$

$$u(x + x r_b + \alpha \lambda x + \alpha \sigma y x)$$

$$\frac{d}{d\alpha} E u(x + x r_b + \alpha \lambda x + \alpha \sigma y x)$$

$$= \lambda x E u' + \sigma x E y u'$$

$$\approx u' \lambda x + \lambda x E u'' \alpha \sigma y x + \sigma x E y u' + \sigma x E y u'' \alpha \sigma y x$$

$$= u' \lambda x + \alpha u'' \sigma^2 x^2 = 0$$

$$\rho = \lambda / (\alpha \sigma^2) \approx 1.81 \alpha^{-1}$$

$$s^2 = \text{var}[(x + x r_b + \alpha \lambda x + \alpha \sigma y x) / x] = \alpha^2 \sigma^2$$

$$\text{or } \alpha^{-1} \approx \sigma / s = 5.17 \text{ giving } \rho = 8.84$$

Risk Aversion in the Laboratory

In laboratory experiments we often observe what appears to be risk averse behavior over small amount of money (typical payment rates are less than \$50/hour, and play rarely lasts two hours)

How can people be risk averse over gambles involving such an insignificant fraction of wealth?

Rabin [2000]: Risk aversion in the small leads to impossible results in the large

“Suppose we knew a risk-averse person turns down 50-50 lose \$100/gain \$105 bets for any lifetime wealth level less than \$350,000, but knew nothing about the degree of her risk aversion for wealth levels above \$350,000. Then we know that from an initial wealth level of \$340,000 the person will turn down a 50-50 bet of losing \$4,000 and gaining \$635,670.”

Risk Aversion in the Field

There is surprisingly little systematic evidence about how risk averse people are.

One exception: Hans Binswanger [1978] took his grant money to rural India and conducted a series of experiments involving gambles for a significant fraction of annual income.

His findings: risk aversion is high (ρ on the order of 20), and inconsistent with expected utility theory – initial wealth plays a greater role than the theory allows, along much the same lines discussed by Rabin.

Remark: it is easy to see that deviations from the amount that is “expected to be earned” play some role. But it is a long leap from that to a systematic theory.